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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has long championed arbitration as
the preferred method of resolving labor disputes. In the 1960 Steelworkers Tril-
ogy, the Court held that arbitrators, and not the courts, are to decide the arbitra-
bility of grievances,' that courts should not refuse to order arbitration unless the
parties' arbitration clause "is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute" 2; and that so long as an arbitrator's award "draws its essence"
from the collective bargaining agreement, courts should not review the merits of
the award.3  Labor and management responded by writing arbitration agree-
* Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky Univer-
sity. Special thanks to Edward C. Brewer III, Emily M.S. Houh, and Rachel LeJeune.
I United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
2 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 5 82-83 (1960).
3 United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
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ments into virtually all collective bargaining agreements.4 Throughout the
nearly half century that has elapsed since Steelworkers, the Court has continu-
ally reaffirmed the centrality of arbitration to the resolution of labor disputes,
5
and indeed has expanded the favor for arbitration into other contexts.
6
Collective bargaining agreements, however, seldom resolve all sources
of conflict between labor and management, so the parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement frequently sign side or settlement agreements to deal with these
unanticipated issues. If a dispute arises concerning the interpretation of a side or
settlement agreement, it often is unclear whether that dispute must be resolved
through the courts or through arbitration. The federal circuit courts are split
concerning the circumstances under which disputes regarding these side and
settlement agreements are covered by the arbitration clause contained in the
underlying bargaining agreement. Two circuits - the Second7 and Fourth8 -
have held that a dispute over the terms of the side or settlement agreement is
arbitrable only if the subject matter of the side or settlement agreement is similar
to that of the collective bargaining agreement. Three circuits - the Third,9 Sev-
enth,' and Ninth" - have created a rebuttable presumption 2 that disputes in-
4 See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 411 n.1 1 (1988) (noting that
99% of sampled collective bargaining agreements contained arbitration clauses); Pryner v. Tractor
Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[A]rbitration ... becomes an issue in a section
301 case only when a collective bargaining agreement happens to contain (as most such agree-
ments do) an arbitration clause."); Martin v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 105 F.3d 40, 42 (1st Cir.
1997) (noting that arbitration clauses are "almost always a feature of labor contracts"); Richard A.
Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theoreti-
cal Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV. 688, 691 & n.19 (noting that "[n]early
every collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause").
5 See, e.g., Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991); Paperworkers v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650
(1986).
6 See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to
Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 593 (1995) (not-
ing the expansion of the Court's arbitration doctrines into the employment context); Stephen J.
Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements,
2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89, 89 (noting the expansion of the Court's arbitration doctrines into the
consumer context).
7 Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991).
8 Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 830-31 (4th Cir. 1985).
9 L.O. Koven & Brother, Inc. v. Local Union No. 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196,
204-05 (3d Cir. 1967).
10 Niro v. Fearn Int'l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987).
1 Inlandboatmens Union v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002).
12 For an extensive discussion of presumptions and inferences, see Anna Laurie Bryant &
Richard A. Bales, Using the Same Actor "Inference" in Employment Discrimination Cases, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 255,281-83.
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volving a side or settlement agreement are arbitrable if the subject matter of the
side or settlement agreement is within the scope of the arbitration clause of the
collective bargaining agreement and if the parties have not otherwise excluded
the subject from arbitration.
This article argues that courts should adopt the "scope of the arbitration
clause" approach to determining the arbitrability of side or settlement agree-
ments. Part II describes the historical evolution of the Supreme Court's arbitra-
tion doctrines. Part 11 presents the circuit split on the issue of the arbitrability
of disputes involving side or settlement agreements. Part IV analyzes the argu-
ments on both sides of the issue. It argues that the "scope of the arbitration
clause" approach is the better approach because, compared to the alternative
approach, it is more determinate, more consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent, more likely to reflect the intent of the parties, and more consistent with the
Court's ideological view of labor relations. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND: ARBITRATION UNDER SECTION 301
A. Section 301
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") pro-
vides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor or-
ganizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
13
Notably absent from this statutory language is any mention of arbitration.'
4
Nonetheless, this provision has become the centerpiece of the Supreme Court's
labor arbitration doctrines.
The first major litigated issue with respect to § 301 was whether the sec-
tion was simply jurisdictional or whether it authorized federal courts to create
federal substantive law.' 5 In the 1955 case of Westinghouse Salaried Employ-
ees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,'6 the Court held that § 301 was purely juris-
13 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1998).
14 Roberto L. Corrada, The Arbitral Imperative in Labor and Employment Law, 47 CATH. U.
L. REV. 919, 922 (1998); Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The
Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557, 583 (1983).
15 PATRICK HARDIN & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1300 (4th ed.
2001).
16 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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dictional.17 Two years later, however, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills
of Alabama, 8 the Court reversed course. 19 The union had sued under § 301
for specific performance of an arbitration agreement.20 The Court, stating that
arbitration agreements are a "quid pro quo" for no-strike agreements, 2' inter-
preted § 301 as expressing "a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
[arbitration] agreements. . . and that industrial peace can be best obtained only
in that way. 2  The Court held that "the substantive law to apply in suits under
§ 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws. 2 3 The Court then explained that while some of this sub-
stantive law could be found in the LMRA,
[o]ther problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory
mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanctions but will
be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashion-
ing a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judi-
cial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the prob-
lem .... Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern,
not state law.
24
Thus, because federal law governed, the unenforceability of arbitration agree-
ments at common law did not preclude the enforceability of such agreements
under § 301, and the Court held that the employer should be ordered to arbitrate
the union's claims.25
B. The Steelworkers Trilogy
Lincoln Mills heralded grievance arbitration as the raison d'etre for the
new federal common law that the Court created out of § 301. The special status
of arbitration in the resolution of labor grievances was ensconced in the three
simultaneously-issued 1960 cases known collectively as the Steelworkers Tril-
17 Id. at 449, 459.
18 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19 Although Lincoln Mills undermined the rationale of Westinghouse, Westinghouse was not
formally overruled until Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 194 (1962).
20 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 456.
24 Id. at 457.
25 Id.
[Vol. 105
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ogy. In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Corp.,26 an employee
injured on the job filed a workers' compensation claim and produced evidence
that he was 25% permanently disabled.27 The employer and employee settled
this claim, but two weeks later the union filed a grievance arguing that the em-
ployee should be permitted to return to work.28 The employer refused to arbi-
trate, arguing that the employee's admission of permanent disability in the
workers' compensation claim precluded the union from arguing in the grievance
that the employee was able to return to work.29 The lower courts refused to
30compel arbitration.
The Supreme Court reversed. Recognizing that the arbitration of even
frivolous claims may have "therapeutic values" conducive to the collective bar-
gaining context, 31 the Court stated:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have
agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the
arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seek-
ing arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed
by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a
question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator.32
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,33 the second
case of the Steelworkers Trilogy, the union sought to compel arbitration of the
employer's contracting-out of maintenance work.34 The employer refused to
arbitrate, relying on a provision in the collective bargaining agreement that ex-
empted from arbitration matters "which are strictly a function of manage-
ment. 35 The lower courts had refused to order arbitration.36
Again, the Supreme Court reversed. Distinguishing commercial arbitra-
tion of statutory claims,37 in which case precedent precluded the enforcement of
26 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
27 Id. at 566.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 568.
32 Id. at 567-68.
33 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
34 Id. at 575-76.
35 Id. at 577.
36 Id.
37 At both English and American common law, an arbitration agreement was revocable by
either party at any time before an award was rendered. See, e.g., Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 597
5
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pre-dispute arbitration agreements, 38 the Court stated that while commercial
arbitration may be an inadequate substitute for litigation, labor arbitration "is the
substitute for industrial strife. 39 While issues of substantive arbitrability were
to be determined by courts, such issues must be reached with due regard for a
strong presumption of arbitrability: "An order to arbitrate the particular griev-
ance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 40 This decision, like
American Manufacturing, was very favorable toward labor arbitration.
Finally, in the third case of the Trilogy, United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp.,4' the Court established an extraordinarily deferential
standard for the judicial review of labor arbitration awards. A company fired a
group of employees after they walked off the job to protest a fellow employee's
discharge. 42 The arbitrator found that although the walk-out was improper, the
penalty was inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement, and ordered
reinstatement with back pay less a ten-day suspension.43 The employer refused
(K.B. 1610); Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746); Or. & W. Mortgage Sav. Bank v.
Am. Mortgage Co., 35 F. 22, 23 (C.C.D. Or. 1888). This changed with the enactment of the 1925
United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), re-enacted in 1947 as the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). The FAA provides for the specific enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements. Id. § 2. It also contains a clause excluding "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id.
§ 1.
Prior to 1953, circuit courts were divided over whether courts could compel arbitration of a
dispute arising under a collective bargaining agreement, and if so, whether the FAA or § 301 of
the LMRA was the proper statutory authority for doing so. See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 38-44 (1997). The Supreme Court re-
solved this issue in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957), by hold-
ing that § 301 grants federal courts the authority to order specific performance of an arbitration
agreement contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
38 See Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (voiding pre-dispute arbitration agreement with
respect to claim arising under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933). See generally BALES,
supra note 37, at 18-19, 23-26 (discussing the public policy defense to the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements). Wilko has since been overruled, and the public policy defense is dead. See
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko);
Mitusbishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (creating a pre-
sumption of arbitrability in favor of arbitrating statutory claims).
39 Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 578; cf Corrada, supra note 14, at 926 ("Today, as
the strike threat has generally diminished, if employers view arbitration favorably, they would
likely see it as a substitution for litigation.").
40 Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
41 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
42 Id. at 595.
43 Id.
[Vol. 105
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to comply with the award, and the union sued for enforcement. 4  The district
court agreed with the union and ordered compliance, but the court of appeals
refused to enforce the arbitral award.45
The Supreme Court, as in the previous two Trilogy cases, reversed. The
Court held that a labor arbitrator's award is "final"'46 so long as it "draws its es-
sence from the collective bargaining agreement. ' ,47 Any doubt must be resolved
in favor of enforcement; "[a] mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an
award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his
authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award.""8 Arbitration, rea-
soned the Court, is a creature of contract, and the parties should receive the arbi-
tral (not judicial) decision for which they bargained 9
The Steelworkers Trilogy collectively established a virtually irrebuttable
presumption of arbitrability and a sharply limited role for the courts before, dur-
ing, and after arbitration.5 0 In some senses, however, the importance of the Tril-
ogy exceeds the sum of its holdings, because it was in the Trilogy cases that the
Supreme Court first articulated clearly the ideological view of collective bar-
gaining and arbitration that still governs modem labor relations law. This ideo-
logical view is discussed in the next section.
C. The Ideology of Arbitration5 1
Industrial pluralism is a model of labor relations that eschews outside
interference and instead deems workers, with a little help from the law, as suffi-
ciently empowered to look after themselves.5 2 This model underlies the Na-
44 Id.
45 Id. at 595-96.
46 Id. at 599.
47 Id. at 597.
48 Id. at 598.
49 Id. at 599.
50 See BALES, supra note 37, at 20.
51 See Richard A. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law: Individual Autonomy and
the Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1863, 1867-71
(1994).
52 See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Conflicts Between
Reasonable Accommodation and Collective Bargaining, 2 CORNELL. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 162-
64 (1992) (describing the industrial pluralism model and how it is embodied in the NLRA); Harry
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1007 (1955)
(arguing that the collective bargaining process and the grievance procedures created therein con-
stitute an "autonomous rule of law"); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Plu-
ralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bar-
gaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 622-24 (1992) (discussing the industrial pluralist under-
standing of constructing an autonomous workplace).
7
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tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),53 was articulated at length by
scholars/labor arbitrators Harry Shulman 54 and Archibald Cox,55 and was
adopted by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy. According to this
model, the NLRA establishes a legal framework through which employees can
organize56 to acquire the bargaining power they need to influence wages, work-
ing conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment.57 Through this
legal empowerment, workplace relations become analogous to miniature politi-
cal democracies58 in which employers and employees, roughly coequal,59 jointly
negotiate and enforce 60 an agreement that establishes the terms and conditions of
employment. 61 The process of collective bargaining thus gives employees a
53 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1988).
54 Shulman, supra note 52.
55 Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 274, 275-76 (1948).
56 For a discussion of the tensions between individualism and collectivism, see Clyde W.
Summers, Individualism, Collectivism, and Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 453 (2001).
57 See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1423 (1993) (stating that "[w]hile the dimin-
ished bargaining power of individual workers vitiated the normative force of their voluntary
choice to submit to the authority of the large-scale enterprise, collective bargaining would em-
power workers sufficiently to cleanse that choice of duress"); Shulman, supra note 52, at 1000
(explaining that the NLRA established a "bare legal framework [that] is hardly an encroachment
on the premise that wages and other conditions of employment be left to autonomous determina-
tion by employers and labor"); see also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (citing the "inequality of bargain-
ing power" between centralized employers and employees "who do not possess full freedom of
association or actual liberty of contract" as a reason that the NLRA was needed); 78 CONG. REC.
3678 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 20 (1985) (arguing that there must be equality of
bargaining power which is accomplished through the employees' right to participate in collective
bargaining).
58 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 55, at 275-76 (comparing collective bargaining agreements with
administrative and judicial processes); Stone, supra note 52, at 622-24 (stating that labor and
management are like political parties in a democracy, each with its own constituency and agenda);
Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV.
7, 9 (1988) (noting that collective bargaining provides a measure of industrial democracy).
59 JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 43 (4th rev.
ed. 1936) (stating that employees are empowered by collective bargaining and minimum wage
laws that create equal bargaining power between employees and their employer).
60 David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 663, 742 (1973) (noting that "[t]he enforcement mechanism ... is the essence of the indus-
trial collective bargaining agreement" assuming that both labor and management comply with the
jointly agreed rules).
61 See CLINTON S. GOLDEN & HAROLD J. RUTrENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY 30 (1942) (noting the role of labor and management in collective bargaining).
[Vol. 105
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voice in decisions that significantly influence their lives,62 freeing them from
unilateral employer dictates.63
Thus, the NLRA shifted workplace sovereignty from employers and the
courts (which had been issuing labor injunctions) to employers and employees,
creating a framework for the joint determination of workplace rights through
collective bargaining.64 Establishing an internal mechanism for resolving dis-
putes between employers and employees was critical to maintaining this shift in
sovereignty. 65 Arbitration quickly became this mechanism. 66 In the metaphor
of industrial democracy, the workplace "legislature" promulgated the law of the
shop through collective bargaining negotiations.67 Arbitration, analogous to the
judiciary,68 interpreted that private law. Not only did arbitration provide a prac-
62 Summers, supra note 58, at 9 (noting the entry of democratic ideology into the workplace).
63 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1960) (not-
ing that collective bargaining agreements allow labor and management to govern the workplace
with input from both parties); see, e.g., GOLDEN & RUTTENBERG, supra note 61, at 23-47 (noting
the role of labor and management in collective bargaining); Barenberg, supra note 57, at 1424
(recognizing the goal of collective bargaining as "freedom for self direction, self control and co-
operation") (citing Robert Wagner, Industrial Democracy and Cooperations (Radio Address at the
National Democratic Club 4 (May 8, 1937)); William M. Leiserson, Constitutional Government in
American Industries, 12 AM. ECON. REV. 56, 66 (1922) (arguing that labor gained strength by
organizing and thus weakened managements' absolute power).
64 See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 580 (noting that "[a] collective bargaining
agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government"). An exception to this shift
in sovereignty is the doctrine of reserved management rights, which permits unilateral employer
decision making over issues "at the core of entrepreneurial control." Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); accord First Nat'l Maint.
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 666 (1981) (concluding that an employer has no duty to bargain
over a decision to close part of its operations); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (hold-
ing that an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to transfer work from one facility to
another).
65 See GOLDEN & RUTTENBERG, supra note 61, at 37 (noting that in the early 1940s the role of
the NLRB shifted from an enforcer of collective bargaining agreements to a supervisor of elec-
tions, and that this event marked the end of an era during which unions and management looked to
government for the solution of their problems); Leiserson, supra note 63, at 75 (noting the shift in
sovereignty from the hands of owners and managers into a democratic system).
M See United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 594-96 (1960) (noting
that a collective bargaining agreement will often provide for the use of arbitration to settle dis-
putes); Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582 (noting that an arbitrator brings experience
and competence in the subject matter to the grievance process that a judge might not possess);
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1960) (noting that arbitration will be
used for all grievances involving interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement).
67 See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581 (stating that arbitration of collective bar-
gaining agreement provisions creates a "system of private law"); Leiserson, supra note 63, at 75
(stating that trade agreements result in a predictable, constitutional-like form of business govern-
ment); Stone, supra note 52, at 623 (stating that workplace legislation is enacted and contained in
the collective bargaining agreement).
68 See Leiserson, supra note 63, at 63 (noting how arbitration can be used to settle a grievance,
9
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tical mechanism for resolving disputes arising under the collective bargaining
system, it also fit the theoretical model of an autonomous system.69 Arbitration
was purely a product of contract:70 the arbitrator was chosen by, and served at
the whim of, the two parties, and the arbitrator's authority was derived exclu-
sively from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement that the parties had
negotiated. 71 Arbitration thus completed the metaphor of industrial organization
much like a court's judicial power); Stone, supra note 52, at 623 (stating that arbitration is sup-
posed to supply a neutral vantage point for enforcing workplace rules).
69 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (noting that the integral role
of the arbitrator in the industrial pluralist system helps establish "industrial self-government");
Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581 (recognizing that "the grievance machinery under a
collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of industrial self-government" and that
"[alrbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all
the problems which may arise"); Shulman, supra note 52, at 1007 (noting that collective bargain-
ing agreements force the parties to handle their disputes guided by contract terms).
70 The themes of autonomy and judicial non-interference also resonate with contemporary
theoretical discourse on freedom of contract in the commercial sphere. See Emily M.S. Houh,
Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on
file with author) ("conventional economic analysis to contract law suggests that in a perfect con-
tracting world, judicial intervention would be necessary to refuse to enforce contracts only in the
most egregious of circumstances created by the non-complaining party, such as when the com-
plaining [party] has been fraudulently induced or induced by duress to enter into the agreement");
see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 261-64, 275-77 (3d ed. 2000);
ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND
PRACTICE 32 (1990) ("[T]he market does not care about fairness .... As long as there are no
artificial barriers to success, no one should be offended by the functioning of the market ....").
71 See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 53 (stating that an arbitrator "has no general authority
to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties"); Enter. Wheel & Car,
363 U.S. at 597 (upholding an arbitral award "so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement[,]" and stating that an arbitration award that relies on external law instead of
the collective bargaining agreement fails this test); Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582
(noting that the arbitrator's authority is only limited by the collective bargaining agreement's
terms); Harry T. Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The 'Common Law of the Shop'
v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65, 90-91 (1977) (stating that arbitrators should be reluctant to decide
public law issues because they may be wrong and, if followed by a court out of deference to the
arbitrator, they may distort the development of precedent); Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations
About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 557-59 (1967) (stating that
"parties typically call on an arbitrator to construe and not to destroy their agreement"); Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel
and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140-43 (1977) (stating that an award must "draw its
essence" from the collective bargaining agreement in order to be valid and enforceable) (quoting
Enter. Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 597). The late Dean Shulman stated that
[a] proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public
tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a com-
munity which transcends the parties. He is rather a part of a system of self-
government created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure
only, to administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement.
[Vol. 105
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as a self-contained mini-democracy - "an island of self-rule whose self-
regulating mechanisms must not be disrupted by judicial intervention or other
scrutiny by outsiders. 72
D. Post-Steelworkers Developments
Following the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court continued to
emphasize the strength of the presumption of arbitrability. In the 1986 case of
AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers,73 a union demanded to
arbitrate a dispute involving layoffs. The employer refused, arguing that its
decision that a dearth of work justified layoffs was not arbitrable. The Seventh
Circuit directed the parties to submit the arbitrability issue to the arbitrator.
Re-affirming the presumption of arbitrability articulated in the Steel-
workers Trilogy, the Court found the presumption particularly applicable where
the arbitration clause is broad.74 The Court vacated and remanded, however,
ruling that the district court, not the arbitrator, should make the initial
determination of arbitrability.75
A year after AT & T Technologies, the Court decided Paperworkers v.
Misco, Inc., in which the Court re-affirmed the narrow scope of judicial review
of arbitration awards that was established in Enterprise Wheel. The Court again
re-affirmed the limited scope of judicial review in the 2000 case of Eastern As-
sociated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, District 17,77 in which the Court
held that an arbitral award itself, and not merely the conduct leading to an em-
ployee's discharge, must conflict with public policy to justify the vacation of an
arbitral award.
In the 1991 case of Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB,78 the
Court delineated a limit to the scope of the presumption of arbitrability even
while it re-affirmed the presumption itself. The National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") had read into an expired collective bargaining agreement a continu-
ing duty to arbitrate grievances that arose after expiration of the agreement.79
The Court disagreed, stating that "arbitration is a matter of consent, and... will
Shulman, supra note 52, at 1016.
72 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE
L.J. 1509, 1515 (1981).
73 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
77 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
78 501 U.S. 190 (1991).
79 Id. at 195-96.
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not be imposed upon parties beyond the scope of their agreement., 80 The issue,
the Court noted, was a contractual one: "whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
this dispute.,
81
Thus, in the forty-plus years following the Steelworkers Trilogy, the
Court has continued to emphasize the primacy of arbitration and the strong pre-
sumption of arbitrability. At the same time, however, the Court also has estab-
lished that arbitration is a creature of contract, and that arbitrability extends only
so far as its organic clause.
E. Scope of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
The Supreme Court's Steelworkers Trilogy, in addition to establishing
the presumption of arbitrability and the limited judicial review of arbitral
awards, also created a broad definition of what is meant by a collective bargain-
ing agreement. For example, in Warrior & Gulf, the Court stated that "[t]he
labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the
contract, as the industrial common law - the practices of the industry and the
shop - is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not ex-
pressed in it."'82 Again in Warrior & Gulf, the Court said: "The collective bar-
gaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties. It is more than a
contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the drafts-
men cannot wholly anticipate. The collective agreement covers the whole em-
ployment relationship., 83 Consistent with this expansive view of the collective
bargaining agreement, courts and arbitrators have found that custom, past prac-
tice, and oral understandings all may, under appropriate circumstances, consti-
tute an enforceable part of the collective bargaining agreement itself.84
80 Id. at 201.
81 Id. at 209.
82 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
83 Id. at 578.
94 ELKOURI & ELKOJRI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 630 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Gog-
gin, eds., 5th ed. 1997) (hereinafter "ELKOURI & ELKOURI"); cf. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (2002) (provid-
ing that a commercial contract "may be explained or supplemented ... by course of dealing or
usage of trade ... or by course of performance); id. § 1-205 (defining "course of dealing or usage
of trade"); id. § 2-208 (discussing "course of performance"). U.C.C. section 2-202, comment (2)
explains:
Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of course of dealing, usage of
trade and course of performance to explain or supplement the terms of any
writing stating the agreement of the parties in order that the true understanding
of the parties as to the agreement may be reached. Such writings are to be
read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings between the parties
and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was
phrased. Unless carefully negated they have become an element of the words
used.
[Vol. 105
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Another such source of material enforceable as part of the collective
bargaining agreement is the side agreement. Parties to a collective bargaining
agreement often amend or supplement 85 that agreement by entering into a sub-
sequent (often a settlement) agreement. One labor arbitrator has explained:
Although the [collective bargaining] Agreement is the chief in-
strument that guides the parties in their relationships there fre-
quently arises an occasion when it is thought necessary or desir-
able to clarify, add to, or change the Agreement in some man-
ner. This is what a side agreement does. They [sic] are very
commonly used because the parties find them useful in some in-
stances and necessary in other cases.86
Thus, a side agreement becomes a part of the original collective bargaining
agreement.
Most side agreements, however, do not contain an arbitration clause;
disputes arising under side agreements are arbitrable only if the arbitration
clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement will extend to the sub-
ject of the side agreement. The circuit split on this issue is the subject of the
next Part of this article.
HI. THE PROBLEM OF SIDE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
To date, five87 federal circuit courts have addressed the issue of the cir-
cumstances under which disputes regarding side and settlement agreements are
85 Cf. U.C.C. § 2-209 (providing for the modification, recission, and waiver of commercial
contracts).
86 Fox Mfg. Co., 47 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 97, 101 (1966) (Marshall, Arb.), cited in ELKOURi
& ELKOURI, supra note 84, at 599.
87 The Sixth Circuit considered an analogous issue in Bakers Union Factory No. 326 v. FIT
Continental Baking Co., 749 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1984). In Bakers Union, an employee was repeat-
edly disciplined for on-the-job intoxication. Id. at 351. After a third incident, the company, the
employee, and the union all agreed that the employee would return to work under a "last chance"
agreement which provided, among other things, for automatic discharge if the employee failed to
complete treatment for alcoholism. Id.
The employee failed to complete the treatment, and the company fired him. Id. at 351-52.
The union grieved the discharge to arbitration, and the arbitrator, though finding "just and proper
cause for discipline in this case," ordered that the employee be given another chance. Id. at 352.
The company refused to reinstate the employee, and the union sued for enforcement. Id. The
primary issue in the case was whether the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by disregarding the
last chance agreement. Id. at 353. This issue turned on whether the last chance agreement should
be considered an extension of the collective bargaining agreement, such that (a) the arbitration
clause of the collective bargaining agreement would apply to the last chance agreement, and (b)
the arbitrator would not be free to disregard the terms of the last chance agreement. See id. at 353-
55. Regarding (a), the court seemed to adopt a presumption that parties to a settlement agreement
do not intend for the arbitration clause of an underlying collective bargaining agreement to apply
13
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covered by the arbitration clause contained in the underlying collective bargain-
ing agreement. The Second88 and Fourth8 9 Circuits have held that a dispute over
the terms of the side or settlement agreement is arbitrable only if the subject
matter of the side or settlement agreement is similar to that of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. This approach takes into account the overall similarity of
the subject matter of the side or settlement agreement to that of the collective
bargaining agreement, without focusing on the strictures of the arbitration clause
of the collective bargaining agreement. Conversely, the Third,90 Seventh,91 and
Ninth92 Circuits have created a rebuttable presumption that disputes involving a
side or settlement agreement are arbitrable if the subject matter of the side or
settlement agreement is within the scope of the arbitration clause of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, and the parties have not otherwise excluded the sub-
ject from arbitration. This approach emphasizes the importance of the arbitra-
tion clause of the underlying collective bargaining agreement.
A. Circuits Comparing the Subjects of the Two Agreements
The Second and Fourth Circuits have adopted an approach that com-
pares the subject of the side or settlement agreement to the subject of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. This may be called the "collateral contract"93 ap-
proach. In the Fourth Circuit case of Adkins v. Times-World Corp.,94 the Roa-
noke Typographical Union Local No. 60 ("Local No. 60") had negotiated a col-
lective bargaining agreement with newspaper publisher Times-World Corpora-
tion ("Times-World").95 This agreement contained a clause providing that
"[t]his Agreement alone shall govern relations between the parties on all sub-
jects concerning which any provision is made in this Agreement, and any dis-
pute involving any such subjects shall be determined" pursuant to a grievance
to the settlement agreement. Id. at 354 ("Although the parties may by contract provide that the
settlement agreements are subject to subsequent arbitration, we conclude that the parties in this
case did not so provide."). Regarding (b), the court held that the last chance agreement was bind-
ing on the arbitrator, and that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by disregarding it. Id. at
356. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions that the arbitration award be
vacated. Id.
88 Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991).
89 Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 830-31 (4th Cir. 1985).
90 L.O. Koven & Brother, Inc. v. Local Union No. 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196,
204-05 (3d Cir. 1967).
91 Niro v. Fearn Int'l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987).
92 Inlandboatmens Union v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002).
93 See Cornell Univ., 942 F.2d at 140.
94 771 F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1985).
95 Id. at 830.
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procedure culminating in binding arbitration.96 Local No. 60 and Times-World
also negotiated an addendum agreement which guaranteed job security until
retirement to certain printers employed in Times-World's composing room.
97
Both the collective bargaining agreement and the addendum were renewed sev-
eral times over a period of ten years.
98
During negotiations attendant to one of the renewals, Local No. 60 and
Times-World agreed to a reduction-in-force program, under which Times-World
offered to pay a lump-sum severance to any of five printers who voluntarily
retired early. 9 An insufficient number of these printers took the early retire-
ment option, however, and Times-World laid three of them off. 0oo Local No. 60
grieved the layoffs, and both the union and the company agreed to submit the
dispute to arbitration.' 0' The printers, however, filed suit in federal district court
against both the union and the company, seeking a stay of arbitration. 0 2 The
district court granted the stay, and both Times-World and Local No. 60 ap-
pealed.
10 3
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit framed the issue as "whether the adden-
dum [wa]s part of the collective bargaining agreement."'' 4 In determining that it
was, the court focused on three things: the language of the addendum, the nego-
tiation history of the addendum, and the conduct of the parties.'05 Regarding the
language of the addendum, the court noted that the title "addendum" "suggested
an inseparable link to another instrument, specifically the collective bargaining
agreement."'' 6 The court then compared the subject matter of the addendum to
that of the collective bargaining agreement, and determined that "[t]he adden-
dum relate[d] to a major concern of the principal agreement, namely employ-
ment and layoff procedures for specific employees.' 0 7
Regarding the negotiation history of the addendum, the court noted that
the addendum had no existence separate from the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and that the addendum and collective bargaining agreement were thrice
96 Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1985).
97 Id. at 830.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 830-31.
103 Id. at 831.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 831-32.
106 Id. at 832.
107 Id.
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renewed simultaneously. 0 8 Finally, regarding the conduct of the parties, the
court noted that both Local No. 60 and one of the printers had filed a grievance
concerning the layoffs and requested arbitration.' 9 For all these reasons, the
court determined that collective bargaining agreement and the addendum were
"part of the same contract" and therefore both subject to the arbitration clause
contained in the bargaining agreement." 0 The court therefore reversed and re-
manded with instructions that the stay of arbitration be vacated.'
For purposes of categorizing this case, the specific outcome (requiring
arbitration of a side agreement) is less important than the process by which the
court reached that outcome. The salient consideration is the fact that the court
relied in large part on a comparison between the subject of the addendum and
the subject of the collective bargaining agreement. As the next case illustrates,
courts that follow this same approach do not necessarily reach the same out-
come.
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit also has adopted an ap-
proach by which it compares the subject of the addendum and the subject of the
collective bargaining agreement. In Cornell University v. UAW Local 2300,' 12
Local 2300 of the United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America ("Local 2300") and Cornell University negotiated a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that, among other things, referred to a Cornell Health
Care Plan ("Health Care Plan" or "Plan") and required Cornell to notify Local
2300 prior to changing the Plan. ' 3 The agreement also contained a clause pro-
viding that an arbitrable grievance included "any matter involving the interpreta-
tion or application of this Agreement which alleges a violation of the rights of
an employee or the Union under the terms of this Agreement."'
' 4
During negotiations over the collective bargaining agreement, Local
2300 made several proposals that Cornell rejected." 5 The parties later incorpo-
rated these proposals into a letter of understanding." 6 This letter contained a
clause agreeing that the parties would jointly form a health insurance committee
for the purpose of cost containment and review of health insurance plan infor-
mation."1
7
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 831.
III Id. at 832-33.
112 942 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1991).
113 Id. at 139.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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A year later, Cornell announced changes to the Health Care Plan and,
consistent with the notice provision in the collective bargaining agreement, noti-
fied Local 2300."8 Local 2300 grieved, arguing that Cornell had circumvented
the letter of understanding by failing to present the changes first to the health
insurance committee." 9 Local 2300 filed a request for arbitration, arguing that
the grievance was arbitrable because the letter of understanding was part of the
collective bargaining agreement and therefore subject to the bargaining agree-
ment's arbitration clause.1 20 Cornell sued for a stay of arbitration, arguing that
the letter of understanding was not part of the collective bargaining agreement
and that it therefore was not subject to the arbitration clause.' 2' Local 2300
counterclaimed, seeking arbitration and damages. 22  On cross motions for
summary judgment, the district court ruled for Cornell, and Local 2300 ap-
pealed. 1
23
Like the Fourth Circuit in Adkins, the Second Circuit framed the issue
as whether the letter of understanding "may be read as part and parcel of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement or whether it is collateral to it."' 24 If the letter
of understanding "supplements [the collective bargaining agreement] and does
not stand alone as a side agreement," then the arbitration agreement would apply
to the letter agreement. 25 if, however, the letter of understanding is "dissimilar
and ... a contract set apart and distinct from" the collective bargaining agree-
ment, then the arbitration agreement would not apply to the letter agreement.
126
Again, as in Adkins, the issue turned on the similarity in subject matter between
the side agreement and the collective bargaining agreement.
The Second Circuit concluded that on these facts, the letter of under-
standing created "an entirely distinct and different obligation from" the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, and that the arbitration clause therefore did not ap-
ply. 27 The court based its conclusion on the fact that the health insurance
committee created by the letter of understanding was not mentioned in the col-
118 Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, 942 F.2d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 1991).
19 Id.
120 Id. at 139-40.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 140.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. This is consistent with U.C.C. § 2-202 (2002), which provides that a commercial con-
tract "may be explained or supplemented ... (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless
the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement.") (emphasis added).
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lective bargaining agreement.' 28 The court expressly rejected the "self-serving"
affidavit of a union official that it was his understanding that the letter agree-
ment was a part of the collective bargaining agreement, and relied instead on
evidence that the university had sought to keep the letter of understanding out of
the collective bargaining agreement. 129 Therefore, the court affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court to grant Cornell's motion for summary judgment and to
refuse to compel arbitration.'
30
Thus, both the Fourth and Second Circuits have adopted a similar test
for determining under what circumstances a side agreement will be subject to an
arbitration clause in an underlying collective bargaining agreement: both cir-
cuits have held that the side agreement will be subject to arbitration if the sub-
ject of the side agreement is similar in subject matter to the bargaining agree-
ment. Nonetheless, the outcome of the two cases was different: the Fourth Cir-
cuit required arbitration and the Second Circuit did not. Different outcomes
would not be particularly surprising if the facts of the cases were significantly
different.
These cases, however, are factually similar on the key issue of the sub-
ject matter similarity. The Second Circuit was correct to point out that the col-
lective bargaining agreement in Cornell made no mention of a health insurance
committee, but the general subject of health insurance was a subject of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. Similarly, while the Fourth Circuit correctly
pointed out that the collective bargaining agreement in Adkins contained em-
ployment and layoff procedures for employees, the agreement did not specifi-
cally guarantee the job security of the printers who were the subject of the ad-
dendum. In both cases, then, the side agreement at issue contained specific pro-
visions that related to items covered only generally in the collective bargaining
agreements. To be sure, the Cornell case may have been a weaker case for the
union since the letter of understanding apparently did not explicitly require the
university to submit proposed changes in the Health Care Plan to the health in-
surance committee, but that involves the merits of the case and not the issue of
arbitrability. Thus, the different outcomes of the two cases tend to indicate that
there is a fuzzy line between arbitrable similarity and non-arbitrable dissimilar-
ity. The test has yielded arguably unpredictable outcomes.
B. Circuits Focusing on the Scope of the Arbitration Clause
The indeterminacy of the approach adopted by the Second and Fourth
Circuits is one reason several circuits have rejected that approach and instead
adopted an approach that focuses on the scope of the arbitration clause in the
128 See Cornell Univ., 942 F.2d at 140.
129 See id. at 140-41.
130 See id. at 141.
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underlying collective bargaining agreement.' 31 For example, in L.O. Koven &
Brother, Inc. v. Local Union No. 5767, United Steelworkers,132 L.O. Koven &
Brother, Inc. ("Koven") had a collective bargaining agreement with United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 5767 ("Local 5767"). 133 This
bargaining agreement contained an arbitration clause in which the parties agreed
to arbitrate "any difference ... as to the meaning, compliance with, or applica-
tion of the provisions of this agreement."' 
34
Koven filed for bankruptcy. 135 Local 5767 filed several claims with the
bankruptcy court for back-owed wages it claimed its members were due under
the collective bargaining agreement. 136 The parties, through the bankruptcy
court, settled these claims: Koven paid Local 5767 $7,000, and in return Local
5767 released Koven from all claims arising prior to the date of the release.'
37
Local 5767 then filed a grievance for back vacation pay that it claimed Koven
owed its members prior to the date of the release. 138 Koven refused to pay, ar-
guing that the release had discharged the grievance. 139 Local 5767 requested
arbitration.14° Koven responded by suing in federal court for a declaratory
judgment that the grievance had been discharged. 41 Local 5767 counterclaimed
for an arbitration order. 42 The district court agreed with Koven, and Local 5767
appealed. 1
43
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the effect of the release should
be arbitrated pursuant to the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining
agreement. 144 The court stated that "unless a release explicitly discharges the
131 See, e.g., Inlandboatmens Union v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002).
132 381 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1967).
133 Id. at 198.
134 Id. at 199.
135 Id. at 198.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 198-99.
138 See id. at 199.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 200.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 204-05. However, the court held that the claim for vacation benefits during the dates
that Koven was being administered under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act was not arbitrable
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 208. For a thorough discussion of the circumstances under
which an employer is permitted to discharge in bankruptcy its contractual obligations under a
collective bargaining agreement, see Donald B. Smith & Richard A. Bales, Reconciling Labor and
Bankruptcy Law: The Application of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 2001 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.
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parties from the collective bargaining agreement itself, or from the arbitration
provisions thereof,... its effect should be determined by an arbitral forum.'
145
Thus, the court created a rebuttable presumption that an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement would extend to disputes arising under side or
settlement agreements.
Similarly, in the Seventh Circuit case of Niro v. Fearn International,
Inc.,146 Dominic Niro was employed by Fearn International ("Fearn") and repre-
sented by Local 744 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Local
744").147 Fearn fired Niro for reporting to work under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, and Local 744 grieved the discharge. 148 The collective bargaining
agreement contained an arbitration clause that applied to "any dispute or differ-
ence of opinion between the Company and the Union or between the Company
and any of its employees covered by this [collective bargaining] Agreement,
involving the meaning, interpretation or application of the provisions of this
Agreement.' 149 Prior to arbitration the parties reached a settlement agreement
pursuant to which Fearn reinstated Niro contingent on his successful completion
of a substance abuse program. 150  Before completing this program, however,
Niro was hospitalized for an overdose of PCP.151 Feam concluded that Niro's
use of PCP violated the settlement agreement, and again fired him. 152 Local 744
did not grieve the second discharge.
1 53
Niro sued Feam for wrongful discharge in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement, and Local 744 for breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion. 54 Local 744 cross-claimed against Feam to compel arbitration over the
alleged breach of the settlement agreement and over the original discharge.
155
The district court concluded that the original discharge was no longer arbitrable,
1145.
145 L.O. Koven, 381 F.2d at 205.
146 827 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1987).
147 Id. at 174.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 175 n.l.
150 Id. at 174.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. For thorough discussions of a union's duty of fair representation to its employees, see
Connye Y. Harper, Origin and Nature of the Duty of Fair Representation, 12 LAB. LAW. 183
(1996); Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127 (1992).
155 Niro, 827 F.2d at 174.
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but ordered the claim for breach of the settlement agreement (i.e., the second
discharge) to arbitration.156
Feam appealed the order compelling arbitration of the second discharge,
arguing, among other things, that the settlement agreement was not subject to
the arbitration clause found in the collective bargaining agreement and therefore
was not arbitrable. 57 The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The rule adopted by the
court was substantially different from the test announced by the Second and
Fourth Circuits in Cornell and Adkins. The Niro court stated that "a settlement
agreement is an arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable,
except in circumstances where the parties expressly exclude the settlement
agreement from being arbitrated."'' 58 Thus, instead of focusing on the relation-
ship between the side or settlement agreement and the collective bargaining
agreement, the Niro court focused on whether the subject of the side or settle-
ment agreement is within the scope of the arbitration clause of the collective
bargaining agreement. If the subject of the side or settlement agreement is
within the scope of the arbitration clause, then a dispute concerning the side or
settlement agreement is presumed arbitrable absent an indication that -the parties
intended otherwise.1 59 The court concluded that Niro's second discharge was "a
subject the parties intended to be a matter of arbitration," and therefore affirmed
the district court's order to arbitrate. 60
The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar approach in Inlandboatmens Union
v. Dutra Group. 6 Dutra Group ("Dutra") was a marine construction, towing,
and dredging company. Its deck hands were represented by the Inlandboat-
mens' Union of the Pacific ("IBU"). 162 IBU filed a grievance against Dutra re-
garding a subcontracting arrangement in which Dutra allegedly leased one of its
barges to another company, Master's Tug & Tow ("Master's"), and subcon-
tracted with Master's to have Master's employees do work for Dutra.163 The
collective bargaining agreement between Dutra and IBU required Dutra to use
only IBU members to perform Dutra's work; Masters' employees were not
members of IBU.164 IBU claimed that three of its members were laid off as a
result of this arrangement.
65
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 175.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 176.
161 279 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).
162 Id. at 1077.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 id
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The collective bargaining agreement between IBU and Dutra contained
an arbitration clause governing "[a]ny dispute concerning... wages, working
conditions, or any other matters referred to in this" bargaining agreement.
166
Prior to arbitrating the dispute, the parties successfully mediated it, resulting in a
settlement agreement. 67 This settlement agreement provided, among other
things, that Dutra would subcontract work to Master's only if Master's agreed to
employ IBU members for labor to be performed for Dutra.
168
Shortly after the settlement agreement was signed, IBU claimed that
Dutra breached the settlement agreement by once again subcontracting with
Master's even though Master's continued to employ non-IBU members to per-
form work for Dutra. 169 IBU sued Dutra in federal court, seeking enforcement
of the settlement agreement and damages. 70 Dutra moved to dismiss on the
ground that the issue was within the scope of the arbitration clause in the under-
lying collective bargaining agreement. 171 The district court agreed, and IiBU
appealed.
172
Like the Seventh Circuit in Niro, the Ninth Circuit in Inlandboatmens
focused on the scope of the arbitration clause in the underlying collective bar-
gaining agreement, stating:
We hold that disputes arising under a side agreement must be
arbitrated if the dispute relates to a subject that is within the
scope of the [collective bargaining agreement]'s arbitration
clause. For example, if the arbitration clause in a [bargaining
agreement] were even broader than the one at issue here, and
covered "all disputes that may arise" between the parties, then
any dispute over any matter, whether or not it relates to a side
agreement, would unquestionably be arbitrable. In contrast, if
the arbitration clause were far narrower and covered only, for
example, disputes over discipline and discharge, then a dispute
arising under a side agreement concerning the assignment of
vacation days would not be arbitrable.1
73
166 Inlandboatmens Union v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1077-78.
171 Id. at 1078.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1080.
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This approach, noted the court, avoids the indeterminacy of the Second and
Fourth Circuit's "collateral contract" approach, and gives the parties to a side
agreement more predictability concerning whether the subject of such an agree-
ment will be arbitrable. 74 The parties are free to specify whether they want the
subject of the side agreement to be arbitrable. 75 If they do not specify arbitra-
bility, then they merely need to "examine the arbitration clause of the [collective
bargaining agreement] ... and determine whether it applies to the subject matter
of the [side] agreement .... The general arbitration clause will apply to a dis-
pute over a side agreement to the same extent that it would govern any other
disagreement between the parties."'
176
In this case, the court noted that the subject of the side agreement - sub-
contracting - was an explicit part of the collective bargaining agreement'
77
Moreover, the arbitration clause in the bargaining agreement was reasonably
broad and extended to subcontracting issues. 178 Finally, the court noted that,
although the parties could have excluded the side agreement from arbitration by
placing an exclusionary clause in either the collective bargaining agreement or
the side agreement, the parties had not done so here.' 79 The court therefore con-
cluded that, since the subject of the dispute over the side agreement was arbitra-
ble under the collective bargaining agreement, the dispute belonged in arbitra-
tion and not in court.' 80
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
As discussed in Part II.C. above, although the Supreme Court has an-
nounced a broad presumption of arbitrability, the scope of an arbitration clause
is not infinite and may be contractually narrowed by the parties. The "collateral
contract" analysis of the Second and Fourth Circuits seeks to further this goal by
focusing on the presumed intent of the parties. The underlying assumption is
that if the subject of the side or settlement agreement is closely related to the
subject of the underlying collective bargaining agreement, then the parties must
have intended disputes arising under the side or settlement agreement to be arbi-
trable (e.g., Adkins). If, on the other hand, the subject of the side or settlement
agreement is dissimilar to the subject of the underlying collective bargaining
agreement, then this group of courts assumes that the parties must have intended
to create a wholly new and self-contained set of contractual obligations. Be-
174 Inlandboatmens Union v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1080.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1080 n.6.
180 Id. at 1080, 1084.
23
Bales: The Arbitrability of Side and Settlement Agreements in the Collec
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2003
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
cause this new contract is presumed to be self-contained, if it does not contain
an arbitration clause, then the parties must not have intended for the contents of
the side or settlement agreement to be arbitrable (e.g., Cornell). Thus, this ap-
proach takes into account the overall similarity of the subject matter of the
side/settlement agreement to that of the collective bargaining agreement, with-
out focusing on the strictures of the arbitration clause of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
There are two problems with this approach. First, the underlying pre-
sumptions may be incorrect. The issue of arbitrability may never have occurred
to the parties when they were drafting the side or settlement agreement; the
purpose of such agreements is to resolve a dispute, not to create new ones.
Conversely, the parties may have disagreed over whether the side/settlement
agreement would be arbitrable, and thus omitted any reference to arbitrability
because they could not agree. Another problem with the underlying presump-
tions is that there is little reason to believe that parties agreeing to a
side/settlement agreement that is dissimilar to the underlying collective bargain-
ing agreement have any less reason to think that an arbitration clause will apply
to their side/settlement agreement than parties agreeing to a side/settlement
agreement that is similar to the underlying bargaining agreement. The presump-
tion is not particularly intuitive, and therefore is unlikely to be an accurate gauge
of the intent of the parties.
The second problem with the "collateral contract" approach is that it is
relatively indeterminate. As the Adkins and Cornell cases indicate, 18' it often is
difficult to categorize a side or settlement agreement as similar or dissimilar to
the underlying collective bargaining agreement. For example, courts may differ,
as the Adkins and Cornell courts did, on how to classify a side/settlement
agreement that discusses in great detail a matter that is only peripherally dis-
cussed in the bargaining agreement. The cases, rather than presenting a di-
chotomous choice between black and white, instead yield various shades of
gray. The resulting indeterminacy in turn undermines the "intent of the parties"
rationale of the collateral contract approach: the parties cannot be presumed to
have intended a particular outcome if the parties cannot predict ab initio what
the outcome will be.
The approach of the other circuits is to presumptively extend the arbitra-
tion clause in the underlying collective bargaining agreement to the side or set-
tlement agreement. This approach, which emphasizes the importance of the
arbitration clause in the underlying collective bargaining agreement, has four
advantages. The first is that it is much more determinate. It avoids the false
similar/dissimilar dichotomy and therefore the categorization problem. More-
over, it can draw upon an extensive body of case law that has developed over
181 See supra Part IM.A.
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the last forty-p1us years for determining arbitrability under collective bargaining
agreements.
Second, the scope of the arbitration clause approach is more consistent
with the Supreme Court's arbitration doctrine than the "collateral contract" ap-
proach. The scope of the arbitration clause approach borrows the general pre-
sumption of arbitrability which the Court announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy
and applies it to side and settlement agreements. No new doctrine is created -
the old doctrine is simply applied in a slightly different (but conceptually simi-
lar) context. Moreover, the contractarian focus on the scope of the arbitration
clause in the underlying collective bargaining agreement is consistent with the
Court's pronouncement in Litton183 and other cases that labor arbitration is a
product of contract and that arbitration clauses should be enforced as far as - but
no farther than - the language of the arbitration agreements permit. The parties
should get what they bargained for, no more and no less.
The third advantage of the scope of the arbitration clause approach is
that it preserves the intent of the parties. It does so in two ways. First, any ex-
clusions or limitations on arbitrability are found in the underlying collective
bargaining agreement. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Inlandboatmens, an
arbitration clause that extends only to discipline and discharge will not cover a
side agreement concerning vacation pay.184 Second, this approach preserves
party autonomy insofar as it permits the parties to either expand or constrict the
application of the arbitration agreement with respect to the side or settlement
agreement. If the side or settlement agreement provides that its contents are not
arbitrable, then the court will respect that agreement notwithstanding a broad
arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement.
Fourth, the scope of the arbitration clause approach is more consistent
with the theoretical underpinnings of the Supreme Court's view of labor rela-
tions. Its determinacy helps keep labor disputes out of court - there is little
incentive to litigate if the parties know who the victor will be. Moreover, its
consistency with the intent of the parties preserves party autonomy and protects
the contractualist vision of collective bargaining.
V. CONCLUSION
Collective bargaining agreements seldom provide an answer for every
conceivable issue that may arise between a company and a union. For this rea-
son, companies and unions frequently decide to supplement their bargaining
agreements through the use of side or settlement agreements. Often, however,
the side or settlement agreements fail to resolve the issue completely, and fur-
182 See, e.g., ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 84, at 34-35, 300-05.
183 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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ther fail to specify whether the subject of the side or settlement agreement is
arbitrable.
The federal circuits are split on the proper test for ascertaining the arbi-
trability of side or settlement agreements. One group of circuits has held that
courts should focus on the relationship between the subject of the settlement
agreement and the subject of the collective bargaining agreement; if the sub-
jects are different, then these courts presume that the parties intended not to ex-
tend the arbitration agreement in the underlying collective bargaining agreement
to the side or settlement agreement. Another group of circuits has held that
courts should focus on the scope of the arbitration agreement in the underlying
collective bargaining agreement, and should order arbitration if the subject of
the side or settlement agreement is within the scope of the arbitration clause in
the bargaining agreement and if the parties have not explicitly provided in the
side or settlement agreement that its contents are not arbitrable.
This article argues that the "scope of the arbitration clause" approach is
the better approach, for four reasons. First, it yields more predictable outcomes
than the "collateral contract" approach because it avoids the necessity of pi-
geonholing the cases into ill-defined categories. Second, it is more consistent
with Supreme Court doctrine concerning labor arbitration, insofar as it merely
extends the long-established presumption of arbitrability into a slightly different
context. Third, it preserves the intent of the parties with respect to the scope of
arbitrability. Fourth, it is more consistent with the Court's industrial pluralist
view of labor relations.
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